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ARTICLE 138 OF THE MINERAL CODE:
A REASONABLE CAUSE FOR NONPAYMENT OF ROYALTIES
An oil and gas lease is maintained during production by the pay-
ment of rent to the lessor. Rent paid out of production is commonly
referred to as a mineral royalty.' A landowner's right to a fractional
share of production2 generally is free of production costs but is often
subject to certain costs incurred after production.' Mineral leases
ordinarily do not fix a specific date for the payment of production
royalties.' As such, a lessee is obligated to pay the royalties due his
lessor according to the custom of the mining industry.5 This custom
contemplates that an indefinite period of time will lapse between com-
mencement of production and payment of the first royalties since the
lessee must complete the administrative details necessary to effect
accurate payments. Subsequent payments are due monthly unless some
intervening event makes it unduly difficult for the lessee to calculate
the amount due.'
Louisiana courts have had difficulty with suits involving untimely
payment or nonpayment of mineral royalties Prior to the enactment
of the Louisiana Mineral Code in 1975, the courts held that when a
mineral lessee failed to pay royalties due his lessor for an appreciable
length of time without a justifiable reason for such delay, he actively
breached his obligation under the lease. Since the breach was con-
sidered an active one, the lessor did not need to put the lessee in
default as a prerequisite to a judicial demand for damages or dissolu-
* Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:213 (1974).
2. A royalty often is 1/8 of production, but it may be any other fractional share.
See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 656 (1982).
Louisiana landowners often can bargain for a larger fractional share of oil and
gas production than 1/8 because Louisiana land has proved to be quite productive.
See, e.g., Bayou Bouillon Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 385 So. 2d 834, 835 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1980) (leases provided for royalties of 1/5 and 1/6 of production).
3. For example, a royalty may be subject to production or gathering taxes, treat-
ment costs to render the product marketable, and costs of transporting the product
to market. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 2, at 657.
4. See Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 611, 89 So. 2d 135, 141 (1956); Sellers
v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So. 2d 435, 436 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
5. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:123 (1974) states: "A mineral lessee is obligated
to make timely payment of [royalties] according to the terms of the contract or the
custom of the mining industry in question if the contract is silent." (emphasis added.)
6. See Touchet v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 191 F. Supp. 291, 295 (W.D. La. 1960);
Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 614, 89 So. 2d 135, 142 (1956); Pierce v. Atlantic
Ref. Co., 140 So. 2d 19, 25 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
7. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:137 (1974), comment: "The area of dissolution
of mineral leases for nonpayment of production royalties has been one of the most,
if not the most confused and unsatisfactory areas of Louisiana mineral law."
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tion of the lease.8 Conversely, if the lessee had a reasonable cause
for not paying the royalties when they became due, his breach was
only passive and the lessor had to put him in default before seeking
any type of judicial relief.'
The prior jurisprudential rule left uncertain what a court would
view as an appreciable length of time and what a court would con-
sider justifiable circumstances for a delay in payment or nonpayment
of royalties. ° The courts answered these two questions on a case-by-
case basis by weighing several factors." The rule provided no
guidelines for determining whether the delayed payment or nonpay-
ment was justifiable. Thus, prior to seeking judicial relief, lessors did
not know when they needed to put their lessees in default. In addi-
tion, the rule unduly burdened lessees, who (after investing large
amounts of money in producing wells located on the leased land) might
first learn of a mistake or oversight in paying royalties when suit
was brought against them for cancellation of the lease.
By nature a delayed payment or nonpayment of mineral royalties
is a passive breach of the lease. 2 A lessee passively breaches his con-
8. Bollinger v. Texas Co., 232 La. 637, 95 So. 2d 132 (1957); Melancon v. Texas
Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956); Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197
So. 2d 715 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So. 2d 435 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964). See also note 17, infra.
9. See Hibbert v. Mudd, 294 So. 2d 518 (La. 1974); Wilson v. Sun Oil Co., 290
So. 2d 844 (La. 1973); Huhn v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 337 So. 2d 561 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1976); Canik v. Texas Int'l Petroleum Corp., 308 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975); Alvord v. Sun Oil Co., 271 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Hebert v. Sun
Oil Co., 223 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). See note 12, infra, and accompanying text.
10. See Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir. 1978).
11. In Bayou Bouillon Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 385 So. 2d 834 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1980), the court stated:
[Elach case of this type must be examined on its own facts and circumstances.
Among the factors to be considered are:
1. the length of the period in which royalties were not paid;
2. the amount involved;
3. special circumstances outside the control of the lessee;
4. the lessee's motive;
5. when and under what circumstances did the lessor seek or demand royalty
payments;
6. whether the person to whom the royalty was owed knew about the industry
or was the footing unequal.
Id. at 839 (citation omitted).
12. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:137 (1974), comment. A passive breach generally
is characterized by a "not doing what was convenanted to be done, or not doing it
at the time, or in the manner stipulated or implied from the nature of the contract."
LA. CIv. CODE art. 1931 (emphasis added). See Godchaux v. Hyde, 126 La. 187, 52 So.
269 (1910); Peoples Homestead Ass'n v. Staub, 3 Orl. App. 93 (La. App. 1906). See also
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tract when he fails to make royalty payments because he either omits
or fails to perform his obligation under the lease. 3 A nonpayment of
royalties technically is a passive breach because a later performance
by the lessee is still possible and, presumably, still useful to the royalty
owner." Consistent with other civilian jurisdictions,'5 the Louisiana
Civil Code imposes a default requirement as a prerequisite to judicial
relief for the passive breach of an obligation. 6 Thus, the jurispruden-
tial rule which categorized an unjustifiable delay or nonpayment of
royalties as an active breach of the lease requiring no putting in
default was wholly unsupported by the civil law and was criticized
by a noted authority on Louisiana obligations law." Furthermore, the
distinction between an active breach and a passive breach and the
default requirement for the latter, but not the former, was criticized
by this expert. 8 From the beginning of statehood, Louisiana courts
have questioned the validity of the default requirement. 9 The difficulty
2 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS S 219 in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 403 (1975): "A
delay in performance is, no doubt, the clearest and most traditional example of a passive
breach ...."
13. Bonsall v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. La. 1961), affd, 300
F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962); Cutrer v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 192 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. La. 1961).
14. 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 12, 5 219 at 408.
15. See, e.g., FRENCH CIV. CODE arts. 1139 & 1146 (H. Cachard trans. 1930); GER-
MAN CIV. CODE art. 284 (C.H. Wang trans. 1907); SPANISH CIV. CODE art. 1100 (F.C.
Fisher trans. 1947).
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1933.
17. Professor J. Denson Smith criticized the analysis used by the courts in find-
ing that an unreasonably delayed payment constitutes an active breach:
[H]ow a "not doing" to use the definition attributed to "passive" in article 1931
of the Louisiana Civil Code, becomes "doing something inconsistent" [to use the
definition attributed to "active" in Article 1931] when it is prolonged to an ex-
tent deemed unjustifiable leaves me wondering .... It is most difficult to under-
stand why a delay deemed unjustifiable produces an active breach but if found
justifiable the breach is only passive.
Smith, The Cloudy Concept of Default, 12 INST. ON MIN. L. 3, 13-14 (1965).
18. "[M]y attitude toward the [default] requirement, as applied, is about ninety
percent unfriendly .... I do not think it has any justifiable application in most cases
wherein it becomes involved, and that it stands, far too often, as a hindrance to the
dispensation of justice." Id. at 4.
19. See, e.g., Erwin v. Fenwick, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 229, 231 (La. 1827). In Erwin the
court stated that a defense based on the failure of the obligee to put the obligor in
default "is one which cannot but be felt to have but little relation to the merits of
the case, and not likely to promote equity. Yet ...we have been compelled, though
slowly and reluctantly, to come to the conclusion that it must prevail." See also Sewell
v. Wilcox, 5 Rob. 87, 90 (La. 1843), in which the court, expressing its opinion on the
default requirement for passive but not active breaches, stated, "[Wle have, on more
than one occasion, expressed our regret that such subtleties should have found their
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which Louisiana courts have had in applying the default principles
cannot be blamed on the French, because the Code Napoleon made
no distinction between an active breach and a passive breach of an
obligation.'
The Mineral Code articles governing the nonpayment or untimely
payment of mineral royalties" were designed to clarify the uncertain-
ties of the jurisprudential rule. The active/passive breach distinction
made by the jurisprudence in nonpayment of royalty cases was not
codified. A lessor now is required to give his lessee written notice
of the latter's failure to make a proper or timely payment of royalties
as a prerequisite to a suit for damages or dissolution of the lease.22
Article 138 of the Mineral Code provides that the lessee, within thirty
days of receiving the lessor's written demand for payment, must either
pay the royalties due or give a written explanation stating a
reasonable cause for nonpayment.
Louisiana law, however, will be plagued with the prior rule, at
least for the near future, when suits arise involving leases contracted
before January 1, 1975, the effective date of the Mineral Code.23 More
significantly, an analysis of what constitutes a reasonable cause for
nonpayment or untimely payment of mineral royalties will continue
to be essential in determining the appropriate remedy available to
an aggrieved royalty owner under the Mineral Code. If the cause is
reasonable, the lessee will be liable only for the royalties due plus
interest from the date that they were due if he responds within the
thirty-day period.24 If the cause is unreasonable, damages may consist
of double the royalties due, interest on that sum from the date due,
and attorney's fees. 5 The court also has discretion to cancel the lease
if it finds that the failure to pay was fraudulent," although cancella-
tion is not a favored remedy.27
The jurisprudence has been unclear as to what constitutes a
way into the Code." But see Bailey v. Stetson, 1 La. Ann. 332, 333 (1846), in which
the same court stated: "The law requires, before a party can recover damages for
breach of contract, that he put the other in default. This requisition is imperative
and of its useful operation there can be no question."
20. Smith, supra note 12, at 6; see also 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 12, S 207 at 381.
21. See generally LA. R.S. 31:137-31:141 (1974).
22. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:137 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 644 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981); Bayou Bouillon
Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 385 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
24. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:139 (1974); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1935.
25. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:139.
26. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:139 & 140 (1974).
27. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:141 (1974).
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reasonable cause for an untimely payment or nonpayment of royalties.
The issue has been determined on a case-by-case basis. One federal
judge has noted the lack of guidance provided by the courts' use of
broad terms, such as "justifiable cause"28 and "adequate reason,"29 in
making the determination 2 ° Arguably, much of this uncertainty is
attributable to the fact that the courts deciding these cases prior to
1975 had two separate grounds for holding that a lessee had a
"reasonable cause" for not paying royalties. First, if the lessee failed
to pay royalties which were due because of some honest mistake which
the court considered reasonable, the breach was passive. A law suit
brought by the lessor was dismissed if he had not put his lessee in
default. Second, the courts held that a lessee was reasonable in not
paying royalties which were not in fact due in light of the custom of
the oil and gas industry. The lessor's suit was dismissed in this situa-
tion also, as no breach had occurred. As both situations produced the
same result, the courts were not forced to distinguish between the
two; in both, the courts held that the lessee had a reasonable cause
for nonpayment of royalties.
Hebert v. Sun Oil Co. 1 is exemplary of the first situation. Royalties
were not paid because, through an inadvertent clerical error, the lessee
erroneously deleted the plaintiffs' land from a revised unit. The lessee
tendered payment as soon as the error was discovered. The lessors
refused the tender and sued for cancellation of the lease. The court
found that the lessee had not acted unreasonably; hence the breach
was only passive. Since the plaintiffs had not put the lessee in default,
their suit was dismissed. In such a situation, however, the lessee clear-
ly has breached his obligation to make timely royalty payments and
undisputably must promptly tender payment once he is put in default.
Canik v. Texas International Petroleum Corp.2 is illustrative of
the second situation. In Canik, royalties were not paid for four months
following the creation of a new unit. During this four-month period,
the lessee was engaged in the administrative work that was necessary
to make payments to the ninety-three royalty owners under the newly-
created unit. The court noted that the accepted policy in the oil and
28. Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 614, 89 So. 2d 135, 142 (1956).
29. Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So. 2d 715, 718 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1967).
30. Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1122-23 (5th Cir. 1978): "[Tlhese terms
provide semantic amplification but insignificant definition for drawing precise lines.
Discriminating judgment is required before their conceptual significance yields a
decision."
31. 223 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
32. 308 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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gas industry is to not pay royalties until the Commissioner of Con-
servation has given final approval to the survey plat of the unit. This
approval was given in the third month of the alleged delay in pay-
ment. Royalty checks were mailed within the next month, prior to
any demand by the lessors for the royalties. The court apparently
did not consider the lessee to have breached the lease at all, since
royalties were not due according to the accepted policy in the industry.
However, the question of whether a breach had in fact occurred was
rendered moot because an active breach was not found and no put-
ting in default had occurred.
Prior to 1975, the phrase "reasonable cause for nonpayment of
royalties" apparently was used in a dual sense by the courts. The
phrase "reasonable cause for nonpayment" utilized by article 138 of
the Mineral Code obviously is taken from the jurisprudence, but its
exact meaning in light of the structure of the new articles is unclear.
Predictability of results in future cases inevitably may depend upon
a careful examination of the factors which the courts previously con-
sidered in addressing the issue and their applicability under the
Mineral Code.
Reasonable Cause as Interpreted in Pre-Code Cases
Length of Time
The length of time for which royalties are withheld has been a
factor used by the courts in determining whether the delay or non-
payment is justifiable. The second circuit, in Bailey v. Meadows,l noted
that unless a lessee has a good excuse, his withholding of royalties
for "any appreciable length of time"'" is unreasonable. The defendant-
lessees in Bailey claimed that an eighteen-month delay in payment
of royalties was due to continuing negotiations between themselves
and the operator of the production unit. However, the court reasoned
that the amount of royalties due the plaintiff-lessors would be un-
affected by the outcome of these negotiations. Hence, the court held
that a delay of eighteen months was unreasonable and cancelled the
lease. 5
The rule established in Bailey, i.e., a withholding of royalties
without a good excuse for any appreciable length of time is
unreasonable, set the standard for future cases in which time was
33. 130 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
34. Id. at 508.
35. Id. at 504-08.
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considered as a factor. The case of Sellers v. Continental Oil Co.3 in-
volved a lease originally covering a large tract of land owned by five
brothers, four of whom were plaintiffs in the suit. Through partial
releases by the lessee, the land under the lease was reduced to two
noncontiguous tracts. Royalties owed on one of the two noncontiguous
tracts were not paid to the plaintiffs for thirty-three months. The
lessee offered no explanation for such delay; as a result, the third
circuit ordered partial cancellation of the lease as to the tract for which
royalties had not been paid. 7 The Sellers holding is consistent with
the Bailey standard. Certainly, a thirty-three month delay is an
appreciable length of time. Since the lessee offered no explanation
for such delay, withholding the royalties was unreasonable.
In Canik v, Texas International Petroleum Corp.,8 a more recent
case, the lessor's demand for cancellation of the lease because of a
delayed royalty payment was denied. In Canik, the defendant-lessee
had delayed payment for slightly more than four months while it ascer-
tained the royalties due the ninety-three separate owners under a
newly-created production unit. 9 The basis for the court's decision in
Canik is unclear. One interpretation is that the delay in Canik, while
not in compliance with the lease, was held reasonable, i.e., only a
passive breach, because it was only for a short period of time. Alter-
natively, the court may have believed that the lessee had a good
excuse for the delay because of the complex circumstances involved
in computing the amount owed to the ninety-three separate royalty
owners, i.e., the royalties were not yet due. Either reason would be
consistent with the Bailey standard, which considers both the length
of the delay and the reason for it.4"
Amount Involved
The courts have been reluctant to cancel mineral leases because
of an untimely or inaccurate payment of royalties when the amount
in dispute is small. The court in Hebert v. Sun Oil Co., refused to
36. 168 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
37. Id. at 436-38.
38. 308 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 456.
40. A similar question may be raised about Sellers. Alternative bases for that
court's decision are that the length of the delay (thirty-three months) was unreasonable
and that the defendant-lessee offered no explanation whatsoever for the delay. Similarly,
the delay in Bailey may have been held unreasonable either because the court con-
sidered that eighteen months was an appreciable length of time or because the excuse
offered by the defendant was unrelated to the cause of the delay in royalty payments
to the plaintiff.
41. 223 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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cancel the lease for unpaid royalties which amounted to less than four-
teen dollars over a ten-month period. An acreage dispute was involved
in Wilson v. Sun Oil Co.'2 The lessees tendered payments for thirteen
months in accordance with a survey of a smaller number of acres than
that specified in the lease. The checks contained a stipulation which
the lessors contended would amount to an accord and satisfaction if
the checks were cashed. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the
lessors had never disputed the survey upon which the lessees relied
in making the payments and, since a dispute is an absolute prere-
quisite to invoking the doctrine of accord and satisfaction,43 the lessees
had made a valid tender. The area of land in dispute was less than
two-thirds of a single acre; thus the withholding of royalties on the
small amount of acreage not included in the survey, but included in
the lease, was held to be reasonable and cancellation of the lease was
denied."
Hebert and Wilson were pre-1975 cases involving suits for cancella-
tion of the lease. The Mineral Code clearly provides that dissolution
of a lease for failure to pay royalties is not a favored remedy.45 Lease
cancellation should not be granted when only a small amount of
royalties erroneously has been withheld. Although the lessee technical-
ly has failed to fully comply with the terms of his lease, courts have
recognized that cancellation of a mineral lease for the nonpayment
of a small amount of royalties is too harsh a sanction to impose upon
the breaching lessee.' 6 Hebert and Wilson, however, are not authority
for the argument that such a breach is necessarily reasonable. These
cases only support the argument that lease cancellation is not an
appropriate remedy for the erroneous nonpayment of a small sum.
If a lessee has unjustifiably withheld even a small amount, his lessor
is entitled to receive greater damages than mere interest on the
royalties. In such a situation, the Mineral Code provides the lessor
42. 290 So. 2d 844 (La. 1974).
43. See 1 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS S 392 in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAw TREATISE
657 (1969).
44. 290 So. 2d at 850.
45. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:141 (1974).
46. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:137 (1974), comment: "[Tihe harshness of
cancelling a lease which may involve the investment of millions of dollars because
of the nonpayment of an insignificant sum of money is obvious."
But see Bollinger v. Texas Co., 232 La. 637, 95 So. 2d 132 (1957), in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court cancelled a lease where not only was the amount of unpaid
royalties very small but the lessor actually had received more money than was due
because of an overpayment of shut-in royalties. The court found that the lessee was
in bad faith in withholding the royalties. Presumably, Bollinger is limited to cases
in which the lessee has acted in bad faith.
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with an adequate remedy of double the royalties, interest on that sum,
and attorney's fees, without cancellation of the lease. 7 This treatment
is consistent with the intent of the revision of the law governing non-
payment of royalties; namely, to protect the lessor by providing an
adequate remedy for him if royalties are not paid when due while
avoiding the harshness which cancellation of the lease may impose
upon the defaulting lessee."8
Special Circumstances Beyond the Lessee's Control
The courts have been willing to consider a nonpayment of royalties
reasonable when it is caused by circumstances beyond the lessee's
control." In Fawvor v. United States Oil of Louisiana, Inc.,50 the Com-
missioner of Conservation established a production unit in May, 1961.
An error in the first survey plot subsequently was discovered, causing
the lessee to be unable to determine the amount of the lessor's land
included within the unit. The court held that under these circum-
stances, a delay of eight months in the payment of royalties was
reasonable. 1
The land under lease in Broadhead v. Pan American Petroleum
47. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:139 (1974): "The court may award as damages
double the amount of royalties due, interest on that sum from the date due, and a
reasonable attorney's fee, provided the original failure to pay was ... without reasonable
grounds."
48. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:137 (1974), comment, provides:
The real problem in this area is that lessors are entitled to some meaningful
remedy besides recovery of interest which will assure that they will receive timely
payment of production royalties.
The total effect of these articles . . . is to provide a spur to timely payment
of royalties due while giving lessees a reasonable way in which to avoid the harsh
remedy of cancellation. The spur is the special remedy.
49. The situations set forth in this section are by no means exclusive. Whenever
royalty payments are not tendered because of circumstances beyond the lessee's con-
trol which prevent him from calculating the amount due a lessor, he has a good argu-
ment that royalties are not due in light of the customs and practices in the oil and
gas industry. See text at note 68, infra.
In Canik v. Texas Int'l Petroleum Corp., 308 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975),
the court found a four-month delay reasonable; the delay was needed to enable the
lessee to determine the amount of royalties owed to ninety-three separate land owners
under a newly-created unit. In Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961), the court held that negotiations between the lessee and the unit operator did
not amount to special circumstances which would be considered a reasonable cause
for untimely payment because such negotiations had no effect on the amount of royalties
owed to the lessors.
50. 162 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
51. Id. at 607-09.
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Corp.2 was wildcat territory."3 Title problems existed as to the owner-
ship of the royalties, and the lessor refused to help clear up his title.
Furthermore, marketing the oil was particularly difficult because the
land was in a low, swampy area. The court held that these condi-
tions, all of which were outside the lessees' control, made the eight-
month delay in payment of royalties reasonable.'
Another such circumstance arose in Mire v. Hawkins,' a case in
which the leased property was inherited by the three plaintiffs follow-
ing the deaths of their grandparents and father. The lands were sold
in 1947 with the mineral rights being reserved to the plaintiffs, who
still were minors at the time of the sale. Royalties were withheld
by the lessee when production began in 1957 because a dispute arose
as to whether the plaintiffs' mineral interests had prescribed by nonuse
for ten years56 or whether such prescriptive period was suspended
due to their minority57 or interrupted due to nondrilling orders issued
by the Commissioner of Conservation. A clause in the lease allowed
the lessee to withhold royalties if any uncertainty arose as to the
ownership of the minerals. The court held that there was a genuine
and bona fide dispute as to the ownership of the minerals in the tract
and therefore the nonpayment was reasonable under the terms of the
lease.58
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized a title dispute between
claimants as a reasonable cause for withholding royalties in Hibbert
v. Mudd.5" Hibbert, the lessee, instituted a concursus proceeding to
determine the ownership of accrued production royalties under a lease
between the lessor and himself. The defendants, the lessor's heirs,
made a reconventional demand for cancellation of the lease because
of nonpayment of royalties for nineteen months. Hibbert claimed that
the nonpayment was a result of a serious title dispute. One set of
defendants allegedly was born of a miscegenous union, and the other
set was born of an adulterous union. All defendants, at best, were
"irregular heirs," and the withholding of the royalties was held to
be reasonable.
52. 166 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
53. "Wildcat territory" is a phrase used to describe a leased area when there
has never been production on it or around it at the time the lease is executed. See
8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 2, at 834.
54. 166 So. 2d at 331-33.
55. 177 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
56. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:16 (1974).
57. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3554.
58. 177 So. 2d at 797-804.
59. 294 So. 2d 518 (La. 1974).
60. Id. at 520-22.
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In a more recent decision, Bayou Bouillon Corp. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 1 the first circuit held that a delay in paying royalties
was reasonable when undoubtedly caused by confusion arising from
the application of the new federal regulations and oil price controls 2
established by the Federal Energy Office under the Emergency Alloca-
tion Act of 1973. The new federal regulations resulted in bookkeep-
ing problems in the lessee's attempts to comply therewith and were
held to be circumstances beyond the lessee's control. 3
A recent federal decision in the Fifth Circuit, Nunez v. Superior
Oil Co.," also involved complex circumstances. Two of the royalty
owners were father and son, both of whom were named Adam Nunez.
After the father's death, the son began endorsing his father's royalty
checks as administrator of his estate. Eventually, the son acquired
his father's interest as sole heir. Some confusion resulted from the
death of the father and the substitution of his son, first as ad-
ministrator and then as heir. This confusion caused the lessee to make
a clerical error. The new division orders issued to the son as heir
of his father's interest were misfiled; hence, royalties as to the father's
interest were not paid for twenty months. The court held that a mere
clerical error by the lessee does not make a delay unjustifiable when
all other conduct of the lessee is reasonable. 5
In most of the cases mentioned above, the lessor's demand for
lease cancellation was dismissed because no active breach was found
and the lessees had not been put in default. Consequently, the courts
were not required to determine whether royalties were even due. The
courts did not clearly articulate whether they believed that the breach
was only passive and no putting in default had occurred or that
royalties were not owed and no breach had occurred. 7 When cir-
61. 385 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
62. See generally 15 U.S.C. SS 751-760h (1976).
63. 385 So. 2d at 840.
64. 644 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
65. Id. at 537. But see Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So. 2d 19, 25 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962), in which the court stated, "IT]he ... bookkeeping problems of the mineral
lessee should not operate as a penalty against the lessor .... Pierce, insofar as it
holds that a bookkeeping error is not a reasonable cause for delayed royalty payments,
seemingly has been overruled, although not expressly, by Huhn v. Marshall Explora-
tion, Inc., 337 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976). See also Nunez v. Superior Oil Co.,
644 F.2d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 1981).
66. Mire v. Hawkins is the only exception. The lease permitted the lessee to
withhold royalties in Mire. Therefore, the court was required to interpret only the
lease. The issue of whether a putting in default had occurred was irrelevant.
67. In Canik, the third circuit came the closest to clearly distinguishing these
two situations. The defendant's attorneys apparently understood the distinction and
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cumstances beyond his control prevent the lessee from accurately
calculating royalty payments, it is questionable whether a breach has
occurred. The custom in the oil and gas industry arguably con-
templates that royalties are not due when such circumstances exist. 8
In Mire,"' the lease permitted the lessee to withhold royalties if uncer-
tainty arose as to the ownership of the leased land. 0 Lessees, as a
prophylactic measure, should insert a clause in their mineral leases
permitting them to withhold royalties when circumstances beyond
their control make payment impractical.
Lessee's Motive
Some suits arise when a lessee, for self-serving reasons, inten-
tionally and in bad faith withholds royalties which are due his lessor.
Courts readily find such nonpayments unreasonable. In Melancon v.
Texas Co.,7 the lessee withheld royalties in an attempt to coerce the
lessor into agreeing to an increase in the size of the production unit
from forty acres to three hundred twenty acres. The Louisiana
Supreme Court found this to be willful and coercive conduct and held
that the nonpayment of royalties was unreasonable. 2 The companion
case to Melancon, Bollinger v. Texas Co.," involved the same drilling
unit, the same lessee, and the same coercive conduct. In this case,
however, the lessor had received more in shut-in royalties than he
would have received as production royalties. The court held that
regardless of the larger amount of shut-in royalties paid, the lessee
had not satisfied the terms of his contract; therefore, the nonpayment
was unjustified, and the lessor had the right to cancel the lease.74
In Nunez," the lessee-defendant had misfiled the records of an
inherited royalty interest. The heir claimed that the lessee intentional-
impressed the court with their argument concerning the industry practices in making
royalty payments. The court referred to the defendant's arguments concerning these
practices and the reasons for the practices in about one-fifth of its opinion. 308 So.
2d at 457-58.
68. See text at note 6, supra.
69. Mire v. Hawkins, 177 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See text at notes
55-58, supra.
70. See also Huhn v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 337 So. 2d 561, 564 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1976), which involved a lease that contained a clause permitting the withholding
of royalties for circumstances beyond the lessee's control.
71. 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956).
72. 230 La. at 622, 89 So. 2d at 145.
73. 232 La. 637, 95 So. 2d 132 (1957).
74. 232 La. at 648, 95 So. 2d at 136.
75. Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 644 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981). See text at notes 64-65,
supra.
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ly had misfiled the records in an attempt to coerce him into executing
a new division order.76 The evidence did not support plaintiff's con-
tention, but the court, in dictum, implied that intentional withholding
of royalties for such coercive purposes would be unreasonable.77
The holdings in Melancon and Bollinger apparently have been in-
corporated into the Mineral Code.78 Certainly, any lessor who is faced
with a situation in which his lessee refuses to pay him royalties until
he succumbs to the lessee's wishes, whatever they may be, has the
strongest argument that he is entitled to the maximum amount of
damages allowed under article 139 of the Mineral Code. A lessee's
intentional withholding of admittedly due royalties to satisfy some
unilateral interest is clearly unreasonable.
Lessor's Demands for Payment
Prior to the enactment of the Mineral Code, the courts, in deter-
mining whether a delayed payment by the lessee was reasonable, often
looked to see whether the lessor made a demand for payment of
royalties due." The courts apparently reasoned that if a lessor made
no demand for payment, he was tacitly consenting to the lessee's
delay." Cases subsequent to the effective date of the Mineral Code
continue to use this test as a factor in the determination.8' Presumably,
the lessor's demand was considered a factor in these post-1975 cases
only because the courts were not applying the provisions of the
Mineral Code, as the leases involved were contracted prior to 1975.82
76. A division order is a "contract of sale to the purchaser of oil and gas. The
order directs the purchaser to make payment for the value of the products taken in
the proportions set out in the division order." 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 2, at 198.1. Superior Oil used division orders to accurately maintain its accoun-
ting records so as to ensure the payment of royalties. 644 F.2d at 537-38.
77. 644 F.2d at 537-38.
78. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:139 (1974), which uses such terms as
"fraudulent" and such phrases as "willful and without reasonable grounds."
79. In Melancon, 230 La. at 606, 89 So. 2d at 139, the lessor had made oral demands
at least three times in the presence of witnesses. In Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140
So. 2d 19, 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), the lessor's attorney sent several letters to the
lessees making inquiries as to payment of royalties owed to the lessor. The court stated,
"Despite the repeated efforts by plaintiffs attorney to secure timely payment of
royalties the royalty payments were not mailed out [on time]." Id. at 29. In both cases
the courts felt that the repeated demands made by the lessors for payment of royalties
were significant factors to be considered in their finding that the failures to pay royalties
on time were unjustified.
80. See 2 S. LITVIN OFF, supra note 12, S 177 at 333.
81. See, e.g., Bayou Bouillon Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 385 So. 2d 834, 839
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Huhn v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 337 So. 2d 561, 566 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1976).
82. 385 So. 2d at 835; 337 So. 2d at 563.
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The Mineral Code specifically states the appropriate time for and
requisite number of demands required by a lessor, the circumstances
under which such demands must be made, and the time given a lessee
to respond to such demands. Once royalties are overdue, a lessor is
required to make only one written demand as a prerequisite to seek-
ing judicial relief." A lessee, after receipt of such demand, has thirty
days in which to respond with payment of the royalties due or a writ-
ten explanation stating a "reasonable cause for nonpayment."84 With
such specific guidelines set forth in the Code, the appropriate time,
circumstances, and frequency of a lessor's demands for payment of
royalties due should no longer be used as abstract considerations in
deciding whether or not a nonpayment is reasonable. The lessee must
follow the specific guidelines or the nonpayment will be unreasonable.
The lessor's suit is premature unless he first makes a demand for
payment.
Bargaining Power of the Lessee and the Lessor
The equality of bargaining power between the lessor and the
lessee is another factor which the courts use in determining whether
the nonpayment of royalties is justified. While lessees very often are
large oil companies, lessors may be poor landowners. In Fontenot v.
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co.,85 the plaintiff-lessor was an illiterate
farmer. The defendant-lessee had sent out division orders to establish
the number of acres that each of the co-owners had under the lease.
The plaintiff, being illiterate, did not understand the bulky, complicated
documents. He refused to sign them because he distrusted the defen-
dant as a result of the defendant's prior attempts to include a por-
tion of the plaintiffs land in the lease against the plaintiff's will. As
a result of his refusal to sign the division orders, the plaintiff did
not receive his royalties for thirty months. The court stressed the
unequal bargaining power between the illiterate farmer and the oil
company and granted the farmer his request for cancellation of the
lease."
The equal-footing factor was used to deny a request for cancella-
tion of a lease where the lessor was experienced in the oil and gas
business and had done extensive work in the field. The plaintiff-lessor
in Alvord v. Sun Oil Co.8" refused to sign the division orders sent
83. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:137 (1974).
84. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:138 (1974).
85. 197 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
86. Id. at 719-20.
87. 271 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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by the unit operator because he believed it was unnecessary. The court
held that the delayed tender of royalties was reasonable under these
circumstances and emphasized that the plaintiff was quite familiar with
the procedures of the oil and gas business.8 Similarly, the court in
Nunez, in denying the lessor's demand for cancellation of the lease,
noted that the lessor had negotiated mineral leases in his law prac-
tice and had studied mineral law in school."
In Fontenot, Alvord, and Nunez, the delayed royalty tenders were
caused by problems with division orders. A lessor who knows very
little about the oil and gas industry has a legitimate concern as to
whether he is being treated fairly by his lessee in such administrative
matters. Therefore, the judiciary correctly considers the parties' res-
pective bargaining power in determining whether the lessee's failure
to make timely royalty payments is justified.
Reasonable Cause Under the Mineral Code
The redactors of the Mineral Code enacted articles 137 through
141 in an attempt to clarify the uncertainty in the prior confused and
unsatisfactory jurisprudential law governing the area of nonpayment
of production royalties. These articles are contained in chapter seven
of the Mineral Code, which deals with the mineral lease. Part four
of this chapter sets forth the obligations of the lessee under a lease
contract. Article 123, contained in this part, clearly states that a lessee
is obligated to make timely royalty payments in accordance with the
terms of the lease or the custom in the oil and gas industry if the
lease does not specify when they are due. Part six of this same chapter
sets forth the remedies for violations of a lessee's obligations under
the lease. Articles 137 through 141, contained in this part, set forth
the procedure to be followed when a lessee breaches his obligation
to pay royalties timely.
The Expos6 Des Motifs, submitted in 1971 to the Council of the
Louisiana State Law Institute for their assistance in drafting the
Mineral Code, covered this obligation and the remedies for its breach
in a single recommendation." The first subsection of the recommen-
dation was equivalent to article 123. The third subsection was
equivalent to articles 137 through 141. Clearly, these articles of the
Mineral Code must be read in pari materia.
88. Id. at 563.
89. 644 F.2d at 538.
90. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA MINERAL
LAW-A BASIS FOR REFORM: ExPosik DES MOTIFS 181-82 (G. Hardy rptr. 1971).
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The second subsection of the recommendation of the Exposg Des
Motifs was an attempt to clarify when a putting in default was
necessary in the event the lessee did not pay royalties timely. The
recommendation provided that whether the lessor needed to put the
lessee in default upon such a breach was to depend upon the terms
of the lease contract. After further consideration, the redactors cor-
rectly did not adopt this portion of the recommendation. A nonpay-
ment of royalties which are due is unquestionably a passive breach
of the lease which requires a putting in default as a prerequisite to
seeking judicial relief under the basic civil law of obligations." Arti-
cle 137 makes it incumbent upon a lessor to put his lessee in default
prior to seeking judicial relief for the latter's failure to pay royalties
timely.
Payment by the lessee within thirty days after being put in default
limits the remedies which the lessor may seek for the breach.92 While
payment within this thirty-day grace period modifies the consequences
of the lessee's breach, it certainly does not justify the breach. Of
course, requiring the lessee to pay royalties within thirty days of his
receipt of the demand presupposes that the royalties are in fact due
and that the lessee is in default.
Article 138 clearly states that the lessee, as an alternative to pay-
ment, may respond to the lessor's demand within thirty days by
stating in writing a "reasonable cause" for not paying the royalties.
Since articles 137 through 141 seemingly presuppose that royalties
are due and that the lessee is in default when demand is made for
payment," it is most difficult to understand what the redactors con-
templated in permitting the lessee to assert a "reasonable cause" in
lieu of payment. Once an obligor is placed in default, he has no
reasonable excuse for not performing immediately.94 The court in
Arceneaux v. Hawkins,95 the only case interpreting these articles to
date, was vexed with this problem. Additionally, the court found it
most perplexing that these articles do not provide a remedy when
a lessee does not pay within thirty days of his receipt of the demand,
but responds with a reasonable cause for not paying. The court,
however, did note specifically that if royalties are due, then they must
91. See text at notes 12-16, supra.
92. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:138-31:140 (1974).
93. These articles consistently refer only to royalties which are due. The remedies
available under the articles also clearly illustrate that the articles make this presup-
position. Whenever damages are awarded, royalties and interest from the date due
are included in the damage award.
94. 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 12, at 405.
95. 376 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
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be paid within the thirty-day time period provided in article 138. The
lessee's written response does not extend this thirty-day period to
some future date."
The language "reasonable cause for nonpayment" in article 138
was undoubtedly taken from the jurisprudence which, for the most
part, was attempting to distinguish an active breach from a passive
breach. As noted earlier, a dichotomy exists among those pre-Code
cases in which the lessee was said to have had a reasonable cause
for nonpayment of royalties. In some cases, the lessee made an honest
mistake, constituting a passive breach for which a putting in default
was required." Under such cases, if a demand was made, the lessee
would be in default and would be required to immediately tender the
royalties due. In other cases, however, the courts held that a lessee
had a reasonable cause for withholding royalties because, in light of
the customs and practices of the oil and gas industry, they were not
due.98 Under these facts, a lessee would not be in default even though
a demand for payment was made, and no contention could be made
that he would be required to tender the royalties until they became
due. He would have committed no breach at all.
The provision in article 138 permitting the lessee to state in
writing a reasonable cause for nonpayment of royalties in lieu of pay-
ment arguably refers only to the situation where the demand has been
made before the royalties have become due.99 As a practical matter,
parties do not specify in the lease contract the exact date on which
royalties will be paid. When the lease is signed, neither party knows
if and when production will occur. Thus, the custom in the industry
generally dictates the time that royalties become due according to
article 123.'0o The first royalties on oil and gas ordinarily are paid
by lessees in the second or third month following commencement of
production. Subsequent payments ordinarily are due monthly."0 ' These
96. Id. at 365.
97. See text at note 31, supra.
98. See text at note 32, supra.
99. Under very limited circumstances, the lessee arguably may admit that royalties
are due but explain that, because of improper payments due to mere oversight for
an extended period of time, bookkeeping corrections necessary to effect accurate
payments will take more than thirty days. No other reasonable cause for nonpayment
of admittedly due royalties is imaginable. The redactors probably Were not con-
templating this limited circumstance when they drafted article 138.
100. See also Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 611, 89 So. 2d 135, 141 (1956);
Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So. 2d 435, 436 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
101. See Touchet v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 191 F. Supp. 291, 295 (W.D. La. 1960);
Melancon v. Texas Co, 230 La. 593, 614, 89 So. 2d 135, 142 (1956); Pierce v. Atlantic
Ref. Co., 140 So. 2d 19, 25 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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payments are calculated from the production in the month preceding
the month of payment. However, circumstances often exist which pre-
vent the lessee from making such payments.' 2 The industry practice
is to not pay royalties until the amounts due a lessor can be accurately
calculated.
One possible interpretation of the redactors' intent in the enact-
ment of articles 137 through 141 is that if royalties are due, they
must be paid within thirty days from the time the lessee is put in
default. Such payment does not prevent the lessor from suing his
lessee because a breach has occurred. The damages, however, are
limited to interest from the date the royalties were due, unless the
original failure to pay was either fraudulent or unreasonable."3 On
the other hand, if royalties are not in fact due when a demand for
them is made, the lessee must state in writing a reasonable cause
for not paying them. In other words, he must explain the cir-
cumstances that have arisen which prevent him from paying royalties
which ordinarily would be due. The lessee should be required to pay
the royalties as soon as this "reasonable cause" ceases to exist. The
written statement forces the lessee to go on record as to why he is
not paying. He then will be prevented from using some other reason
to justify his nonpayment in the event that he subsequently is sued
by his lessor. No remedy is provided in these articles when a lessee
states a reasonable cause for nonpayment because a suit brought by
the lessor would be premature. Finally, if, within thirty days, the
lessee neither pays royalties nor states a reasonable cause for not
paying them, the courts may infer that royalties are due and that
the lessee has no justification for not paying them." ' Such inference
appears to be the tenor of article 140.
The problem with the interpretation set forth above is that it is
contrary to the literal wording of articles 137 through 141. The
language in the articles clearly is to the effect that the lessor, in order
to collect damages, must prove that royalties were due when a de-
mand was made for them. The language implies that the lessee is
put in default when the lessor inquires about his royalties."5 If the
102. See, e.g., Bayou Bouillon Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 385 So. 2d 834, 840
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (complications arising from the application of new federal regula-
tions); Canik v. Texas Int'l Petroleum Corp., 308 So. 2d 453, 457 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975) (establishment of a new production unit).
103. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:139 (1974).
104. "[Tlhe passage of an appreciable length of time without justification apparently
of itself warranted an inference that the breach was willful and unjustified .... LA.
MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:137 (1974), comment.
105. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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lessor fails to prove that royalties are due and that a breach has
occurred, he has no remedy at all within these articles, regardless
of whether his lessee has made any response.
A fair solution to this dilemma would be to require the lessee
to respond, within the thirty-day period, to a demand made after the
time at which royalties ordinarily would be paid108 absent exceptional
circumstances. Requiring the lessee to explain to his lessor that cir-
cumstances have arisen preventing the payment of royalties which
ordinarily would be due would not be an undue burden. In addition
to being fair and equitable to lessors, such a requirement would avoid
useless litigation. If the lessee failed to abide by such a requirement,
the courts arguably could award the lessor damages for the failure
of the lessee to perform the lease contract in good faith and for the
mutual benefit of both parties.' °7
Articles 137 through 141 apparently contemplate a double mean-
ing for the phrase "reasonable cause for nonpayment of royalties."
First, the courts must determine whether the lessee is in default when
a demand is made for payment. If unforeseen circumstances prevent
the lessee from making ordinary royalty payments, he has a
"reasonable cause" for not paying them because they are not yet due.
Second, if royalties are due when demand is made, the courts must
inquire into the lessee's reason for not paying them when they became
due. This inquiry is necessary in order to determine the appropriate
remedy for the breach. If the lessee has a "reasonable cause" for his
breach and pays the royalties within thirty days, damages are limited
to interest on the royalties from the date they became due.' 8
One final problem in the Louisiana law governing the nonpayment
of mineral royalties deserves attention. An interesting statistic was
noted in one of the most recent cases addressing the issue of whether
a lessee's reason for not making timely payments of royalties was
justified. The court in Bayou Bouillon noted that in every reported
Louisiana appellate case since the late 1960s, the cause for nonpay-
ment of royalties was found to be reasonable.' 9 Although it is not
entirely clear why the courts became reluctant to find a nonpayment
unjustified, perhaps this hesitancy was due to the fact that cancella-
tion of the lease was the only remedy that was being granted in cases
106. See text at note 101, supra.
107. Article 122 imposes the general obligation of a lessee to perform the lease con-
tract in good faith. Additionally, article 134 states that "[i]f a mineral lease is violated,
an aggrieved party is entitled to any appropriate relief provided by law." (emphasis added.)
108. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:139 (1974).
109. 385 So. 2d at 839.
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where the nonpayment was held unreasonable. The Mineral Code clear-
ly provides that a court may find a nonpayment of royalties
unreasonable without cancelling the lease.
In almost all other states, mineral lessors are unable to obtain
a judicial cancellation of a lease for nonpayment of royalties."0 Oil
and gas leases often contain a general forfeiture clause which ter-
minates the lease for failure to comply with material obligations con-
tained therein."' However, even when leases contain general forfeiture
clauses, common law courts have strictly construed such clauses and
held them inapplicable to suits involving failure to pay royalties, thus
denying cancellation."2
Although cancellation of the lease is not favored under the Mineral
Code, it is still a possible remedy when royalties are not paid timely."'
Leading experts in oil and gas law have opined that Louisiana law
should not be followed by other states on this matter because other
remedies for nonpayment of royalties are adequate and lease cancella-
tion is much too harsh and in the nature of a punitive sanction.""
Louisiana presumably allows the remedy of lease cancellation
because production royalties are considered as rent under the Mineral
Code."' Previously, the Civil Code provisions applicable to ordinary
leases had been applied by analogy to mineral leases."6 The Civil Code
allows a lessor to expel a lessee from the leased property if the lat-
ter fails to pay rent when due."' In 1940, the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated:
This court has ... firmly established the rule that mineral leases
would be construed as leases and the codal provisions applicable
to ordinary leases would be applied thereto insofar as they may
110. See, e.g., Kelley v. Ivyton Oil & Gas Co., 204 Ky. 804,265 S.W. 309 (1924); Morriss
v. First Nat'l Bank of Mission, 249 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); see also 3 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW S 656.3 at 700 (1982).
111. See, e.g., Gadbury v. Ohio & Ind. Consol. Natural & Illuminating Gas Co., 162
Ind. 9, 67 N.E. 259 (1903); Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106 P.
47 (1910); Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S.E. 978 (1898).
112. See, e.g., Davis v. Chautauqua Oil & Gas Co., 78 Kan. 97,96 P. 47 (1908); Wagoner
Oil & Gas Co. v. Marlow, 137 Okla. 116, 278 P. 294 (1929); Castle Brook Carbon Black
Co. v. Ferrell, 76 W. Va. 300, 85 S.E. 544 (1915); Headley v. Hoopengarner, 60 W. Va.
626, 55 S.E. 744 (1906).
113. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:140-31:142 (1974).
114. See 3 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 110, S 656.3 at 699-701.
115. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:123 (1974).
116. See, e.g., Coyle v. North Am. Oil Consol., 201 La. 99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942); Tyson
v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940).
117. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2712.
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be; "Until the Legislature shall have passed laws specially ap-
plicable to the industry of mining, which is a new one in this state,
the parties engaged in those pursuits and the courts of the states
will adhere to the jurisprudence on the subject, and treat mineral
contracts as leases."11 8
Obvious changes have occurred in the oil and gas industry in Loui-
siana since 1940. First, the oil and gas industry is no longer a new
one in this state. Second, the state legislature has passed laws par-
ticularly applicable to the mining industry by enacting an entirely
separate code. The courts no longer need to follow the law regarding
ordinary leases when dealing with a mineral lease.
Theoretically, the idea of cancelling a lease because the lessee has
failed to perform his obligations therein has its roots in the basic con-
tract law remedy of restitution, i.e., when one party breaches his
obligation under the contract, the aggrieved party may sue to cancel
the contract and have both parties restored to status quo ante."9
Restitution is an impractical remedy for suits involving an untimely
payment or a nonpayment of mineral royalties. One benefit for which
a landowner bargains when he grants a lease is that the lessee will
determine whether there is oil and gas under his land. The economic
risk involved in finding the mineral deposit is the principal considera-
tion provided by the lessee. Production royalties are owed only if oil
and gas is found beneath the surface of the land. Once it is deter-
mined that there are valuable minerals beneath a tract of land, the
value of the land escalates. A landowner who unquestionably knows
that his land is rich with minerals would not grant a lease for an
ordinary royalty. Thus, he would have almost dictatorial bargaining
power in granting future leases. Restitution for nonpayment of pro-
duction royalties, therefore, is not theoretically possible because the
landowner already would have received much of the consideration for
which he was bargaining.
As a practical matter, cancellation of a lease, which may involve
the loss of an investment of millions of dollars because a small amount
of production royalties was not paid on time, is much too harsh. An
alternative, adequate remedy has been provided by the Mineral Code
when a nonpayment is unjustified -double the royalties, interest, and
attorney's fees. ' Even lessors would benefit from a change in the
118. Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 266, 196 So. 336, 342 (1940) (quoting in part
Spence v. Lucas, 138 La. 763, 771, 70 So. 796, 798 (1915)).
119. See J. CALIMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS SS 151 to 153 at 570-73
(1977).
120. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:139 (1974).
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law that would remove the remedy of cancellation of the lease for
nonpayment of royalties. Courts might not be so hesitant to find a
delayed payment unjustified (as they were when applying pre-1975
law" 1) if cancellation were eliminated as a remedy. Thus, lessors would
be more likely to receive double the royalties, interest, and attorney's
fees. Therefore, both the lessee and the lessor will benefit from such
a change. Although the Mineral Code clearly provides that cancella-
tion of the lease for nonpayment of royalties is not a favored remedy,"
it should be entirely eliminated in this area of the law."3
Conclusion
The Mineral Code makes it incumbent upon a lessor to put his
lessee in default prior to seeking judicial relief for the latter's failure
to pay royalties, because such a breach is only passive. Some of the
considerations used by Louisiana courts in determining whether a pre-
1975 nonpayment was reasonable, although cited by the courts in
post-1975 cases, should be inapplicable to such a determination in light
of the specific guidelines set forth by the Mineral Code in this area
of the law. The use of more properly drafted leases containing clauses
granting lessees authority to withhold production royalties under cer-
tain circumstances may avoid much litigation and dispute involving
unpaid royalties. Such clauses will make both parties aware of the
lessee's justifications for withholding payments. Absent such lease pro-
visions, the courts will be required to determine whether the lessee
had a "reasonable cause" for not paying royalties. This determination
may involve two steps. First, the courts must determine whether
royalties were due, according to the custom of the industry, when
the lessor made an inquiry about them. Second, if royalties were due,
the courts must determine whether the lessee had any justification
for not paying them when they became due. Finally, lease cancella-
tion should be eliminated entirely as a remedy in royalty nonpayment
disputes since the Mineral Code provides an alternative, adequate
remedy.
Thomas H. Kiggans
121. See text at note 109, supra.
122. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:141 (1974).
123. If a case arises in which the lessee acts with total disregard for the interests
of his lessor and intentionally withholds royalties which are owed, lease cancellation
may be an appropriate remedy. The court faced with such a case, however, should base
its decision either in tort or on the breach of the lessee's obligation to perform the lease
contract in good faith under article 122. Basing the decision on the failure to pay royalties
timely may set a precedent which would cause courts to hesitate in finding subsequent
nonpayments unreasonable.
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